QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY: SHOULD
ORGANIZATIONS RECEIVE IMMUNITY FOR CHARITABLE
WORKS? - SNYDER V. AMFICANASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS
Since the discovery that Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)' could be spread through contaminated blood, numerous legal actions have been undertaken to determine whether
the blood bank industry should be liable to individuals who contracted AIDS through contaminated blood.! Contaminated blood

I See DAVID W. WEBBER, AIDS AND THE LAW § 1.2 (3d ed. 1997). The first signs of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) were reported by the Centers for
Disease Control in June of 1981 when five homosexual men in Los Angeles contracted pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP). See id. PCP was very rare in the
United States and it was found only in individuals whose immune systems were severely suppressed. See id. One month later, the CDC reported more cases of PCP in
homosexual men and additionally reported cases of Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS), another very rare disease in the United States. See id. The CDC discovered that the
common factor was that all the victims were white, homosexual men and all had severely suppressed immune systems. See id. Eventually, individuals who were intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs, blood transfusion recipients, infants, and immigrants became infected with the disease. See id. This condition, characterized as an
immunodeficiency, was termed Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, and it was
discovered that it was caused by a virus called the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV). See id. An immunodeficiency compromises the immune system by affecting
the cells which comprise the major elements of immunity. See JOAN LUCKMANN &
KAREN
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103 (3d ed. 1987). "AIDS is manifested by a vulnerable immune system"
that makes the individual susceptible to infection and diseases such as PCP and KS.
See id. The virus can be transmitted through sexual contact, use of contaminated
needles, blood transfusions, and mother-to-child infection at birth. See Provisional
Public Health Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening Donated Blood and
Plasma for Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 34
MORBIDrY AND MORTALrY WKLY. REP. 2 (1985).
At the end of 1997, the CDC reported that there were 633,000 cases of AIDS and that the total deaths were
385,968.
See United States HIV & AIDS Statistics (visited Sept. 12, 1998)
<http://www.avert.org/usastaty.htm>.
See Linda M. Dorney, Culpable Conduct with Impunity: The Blood Industry and the
FDA's Responsibilityfor the Spread of AIDS Through Blood Products, 3 J. PHARMACY & L.
129, 130 (1994) (reporting that 6,311 Americans contracted AIDS through blood
transfusions and approximately 12,000 of the 20,000 hemophiliacs in the United
States were infected with HV).
APPROACH
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lawsuits are very difficult to maintain due to blood shield statutes"
that grant immunity to blood providers and the New Jersey
4 courts'
exemption of blood products from strict liability treatment.
In Snyder v. American A'ssn of Blood Banks,5 the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether a nonprofit blood bank association
should be liable for negligently failing to recommend surrogate testing6 of donor blood to its member blood banks.' In particular, the
court examined whether the American Association of Blood Banks
(AABB) owed a duty of care to the recipient of a blood transfusion
and whether it was entitled to quasi 8-governmental immunity or
' NewJersey does not have a blood shield statute; however, it prevents strict liability in tort against a blood bank under the 1974 decision in Brody v. Overlook
Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974). In Brody, the NewJersey
appellate division reviewed a claim against Overlook Hospital and County Blood
Bank, in which a patient who received a blood transfusion contaminated with serum
hepatitis died. See id. at 333-34, 317 A.2d at 393-94. In 1966, when the transfusion
occurred, there was no known test to detect serum hepatitis, and the court determined that blood was an unavoidably unsafe product. See id. at 339, 317 A.2d at
397. Although unavoidably unsafe, the court also determined that blood was not
unreasonably dangerous, thereby making strict liability in tort inapplicable to blood
banks. See id. at 339-40, 317 A.2d at 397. In addition, the court held that, based
upon policy considerations, the hospital and blood banks should not be strictly liable. See id. at 341, 317 A.2d at 398.
4
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987) (removing the liability
of a nonprofit corporation for negligence when the injured person is a beneficiary of the
nonprofit organization's services); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(3) (West 1987)
(permitting a product liability action defense when harm was caused by a product
that was unavoidably unsafe); Brody, 127 N.J. Super. at 331, 317 A.2d at 392, affd, 66
N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (holding that a nonprofit blood bank was exempt
from strict liability because at the time there was no available test to prevent infection from hepatitis-infected blood). See also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super.
281, 292, 582 A.2d 307, 312-13 (App. Div. 1990) (citing Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 442, 479 A.2d 374, 380-81 (1984)). The court noted:
When the essential nature of the transaction involves a service rather
than a product, public policy may dictate, in view of the status of the
provider, that the general welfare is served better by inapplicability of
the strict liability doctrine. Further, when the provider is a nonprofit
institution that supplies a product and that product is vital to the public health, the doctrine [of strict liability] may similarly be inapplicable.
Id.
144 N.J. 269, 676 A.2d 1036 (1996).
6 See id. at 274, 676 A.2d at 1038 (stating that surrogate
testing is the identification of at-risk persons for a disease by testing for some characteristic that is common
in those persons who have already acquired the disease or who are potential victims
of the disease).
7 See id.
8 See BLAcK's Lw
DICTIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1991) ('[The] term [quasi] is used
in legal phraseology to indicate that one subject resembles another, with which it is
compared, in certain characteristics, but that there are intrinsic and material differ-
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charitable immunity.! The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the
decisions of a trial court and the appellate division of the NewJersey
Superior Court and found that the AABB was liable to the recipients
of contaminated blood. ° Further, the court denied the AABB quasigovernmental or charitable immunity."
In June of 1981, health care workers in California reported to
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) the first cases of an illness
that later would be termed AIDS.'2 In response to the disease, the
CDC created an AIDS Task Force to address the fast-spreading immunological disorder, which was primarily affecting homosexual
men." During the period of 1982 to 1984, the CDC AIDS Task Force
played an important role in researching the threat to the blood supply from AIDS. 14 In 1982, Dr. Donald Francis, a virologist,5 epidemiologist, 6 and the director of the AIDS Task Force, discovered a pattern in the transmission of AIDS that resembled the transmission
pattern of hepatitis B." In 1982, a report in the Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)' 8 stated that the cause of AIDS was still
not known, however, the infection of three hemophiliacs indicated a
possibility of transmission through blood products." Additional
cases of infant infection were reported, including children born infected who were the progeny of high-risk individuals and intravenous
ences between them.").
9
See Charitable Immunity Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987); Snyder,
144 N.J. at 273, 676 A.2d at 1038.
:0 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 273, 676 A.2d at 1038.
"

See id.

12 See Pneumocystis Pneumonia -

Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDrny & MORTALrIY WKLY.

REP. 250-52 (1981). The CDC reported that the pneumocystis pneumonia that was

contracted by these five unassociated men was 'unusual." See id. at 251. The individuals were all homosexuals and the CDC speculated that the disease could have
been linked to homosexual sexual behavior. See id.
:3 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 280, 676 A.2d at 1041.
4 See id.
15 See BLAKISTON'S POCKET MEDICAL DICIONARY 868 (4th ed. 1979) (defining a
virologist as "a person who studies viruses and virus diseases").
16 See id. at 276 (defining an epidemiologist as "[o]ne who has made
a special
study of epidemiology"); see also infta note 21.
1 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 281-82, 676 A.2d at 1042 (explaining that Dr. Francis
was the assistant director of the CDC's hepatitis B task force in the 1970s).
18
See id. at 280, 676 A.2d at 1041 ("The CDC's primary means of alerting the
medical and public health communities of new diseases is through the publication
of the Morbidityand Mortality Weekly Report.").
19 See Pneumocystitis carinii Pneumonia among Persons with Hemophilia A, 31
MORnmrrY & MORTALrlY WKLY. REP. 365, 366 (1982).
Hemophiliacs use a blood

clotting factor called Factor VIII, which is manufactured from blood. See id. Factor
VIII is produced by filtering out infectious agents, such as bacteria; however, viruses
are too small and cannot be removed through filtering. See id.
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(IV) drug users as well as newborn infants who received blood trans-

fusions. 20 The CDC soon concluded that the epidemiology2 ' of AIDS
was identical to that of hepatitis B. 2
Due to concerns about contamination of the blood supply, the

CDC AIDS Task Force called an emergency meeting on January 4,
1983, to determine how to prevent the spread of AIDS through
blood. 2 At that meeting, the AIDS Task Force explained the data
that led to its conclusions that AIDS was transmitted through blood. 4
The task force concluded that the AIDS epidemiology was the same

as hepatitis B, that the threat to the blood supply was very serious,
25
and that persons at high risk for AIDS should not donate blood.

The AIDS Task Force recommended preventative measures to screen
out high-risk donors, including: (1) direct questioning to screen out

high-risk people;26 (2) keeping records of donor medical histories to
indicate early AIDS signs; and (3) the incorporation of three surrogate tests for donated blood. 27 The CDC believed that surrogate test-

ing for the hepatitis B virus would be the most effective prophylactic
measure because that test would reveal similar epidemiological ir-

regularities and would protect the donor pool by limiting the participation of high-risk donors.28
See Possible Transfusion-AssociatedAcquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) California, 31 MORBIDrIY AND MORTAIY WKLY. REP. 652-53 (1982). A 20-month-old
infant from San Francisco received multiple transfusions of platelets and it was discovered that one of the donors later developed AIDS. See id. at 653; see also Unexplained Immunodeficiency and OpportunisticInfections in Infants - New York, New Jersey,
California, 31 MoRBIDIY AND MORTALIY WKLY. REP. 665-67 (1982) (discussing that
some of the infants were Haitian, but that the majority were the progeny of mothers
infected with AIDS).
21 See BLAKISrON'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 276 (4th ed. 1979) (defining
epidemiology as "(1) the study of occurrence and distribution of disease; usually restricted to epidemic and endemic, but sometimes broadened to include all types of
disease; (2) the sum of all factors controlling the presence or absence of a disease").
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 285, 676 A.2d at 1044.
23 See id.
24 See id.
5 See id.
20

26

See Dorney, supra note 2, at 140 (explaining that high-risk donors at the time

included homosexual men, intravenous drug users, and Haitian immigrants).
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 286, 676 A.2d at 1044 (stating that the AIDS Task Force
recommended the use of the hepatitis B core antibody test, which tested people
who were or who had been infected with hepatitis B; a T-Cell ratio test, which tested
for a specific immunological abnormality present in AIDS infected individuals; and
an absolute-lymphocyte test, which tested another characteristic present in AIDS
patients).
2
See id., 676 A.2d at 1044-45. The majority stated:
[Olf patients with AIDS, the core test revealed that eighty-eight percent of gay men, one-hundred percent of IV drug users, and eighty-
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At the meeting, the AABB and other blood bank organizations
strongly disagreed with the CDC and rejected the CDC's determination that AIDS could be spread through the blood supply." Furthermore, the AABB representative stated that surrogate testing and
direct questioning would be too expensive, would be an improper
invasion of privacy, and would create blood shortages." On January
13, 1984, the AABB issued a statement criticizing the CDC's recommendation of donor screening and surrogate testing of the blood
supply, stating that the transmission of AIDS through blood was "still
unproven."3'
In August of 1984, the plaintiff, Snyder, underwent elective
open heart surgery at St. Joseph's Hospital in Paterson, NewJersey."
Following the procedure, Snyder needed a second operation to repair a bleeding artery and, consequently, he needed numerous
blood transfusions, including a unit of platelets numbered
29F0784." In 1984, no determinative test was available to conclude
whether blood was infected with the human immunodeficiency virus
(HV) that causes AIDS.' 4 At that time, however, surrogate testing of
donor blood was an available option." Later, in 1985, the ELISA

seven percent of Haitians tested positive for hepatitis B core antibody.
Seventy-nine percent of the control group of homosexual and bisexual men not suffering from AIDS - the most significant high-risk
group - tested positive for hepatitis B.
Id.; see generally M.T. Schreeder, et al., Hepatitis B in Homosexual Men: Prevalence of
Infection and Factors Related to Transmission, 146 J. INFEcnous DIsFFAs.s 7 (1982)
(discussing a comprehensive study of the high occurrence of hepatitis B in homosexual men).
9 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 287, 676 A.2d
at 1045.
30 See id. Dr. Francis stated in his testimony
that:
[T]he reluctance and inertia that we at the CDC faced with the
blood banks in that meeting was so ... ridiculous and so alarming that
it got to the point of me literally pounding on the table and shouting
to these individuals as to how many deaths it's going to take before
you will actAnd I was saying, do you need ten, do you need twenty, do you
need forty, when we get to that level, then are you going to act?
Id.
31 See id.
32
See id. at 278, 676 A.2d at 1038.
33 See Snyder v. Mekhjian, 244 N.J. Super. 281, 284-85, 582 A.2d 307, 309
(App.
Div. 1990); LUCKMAN & SORENSON, supra note 1, at 108 (stating that blood factor
products are prepared from the blood of many donors, such that "[a] single infusion may be extracted from the pooled blood of 1000 individuals").
34
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 278, 676 A.2d at 1038; see also supra note I (discussing
HIV and AIDS).
35 See id., 676 A.2d at 1037.
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Test' was approved by the FDA, thus providing blood banks with the
capability to screen donor blood."
In 1986, as part of a nationwide review program of blood donated prior to the introduction of the ELISA Test, it was determined
that product number 29F0784, the unit of platelets from which Snyder received a transfusion, was contaminated with HIV.38 Snyder discovered in 1987 that the blood he received during his surgery was
contaminated with HIV and, subsequently, he tested positive for
HIV.39
In 1989, Snyder filed a lawsuit against his doctors, the Bergen
Community Blood Center, St. Joseph's Hospital, and the AABB for
strict liability, breach of warranty, negligence, and consumer fraud.'
Snyder alleged that the blood product was defective and that the
blood could have been made safe by implementing known blood
tests and through donor screening. 4' He further alleged that the
AABB rejected implementation of such tests and techniques and,
thereby, failed to prevent infected donors from donating bloody.
At trial in 1990, the New Jersey Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the strict liability
claims, breach of warranty claims, and consumer fraud claims, but
allowed the negligence claims to go forward to trial.4 On appeal, the
court affirmed the law division's ruling on the summary judgment
motion but overruled the order denying Snyder discovery of the donor's records." The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the rulings45 and all defendants except the AABB settled with Snyder."
36 See id., 676 A.2d at 1038. The ELISA Test is an acronym for the enzymelinked immunoabsorbent-assay-screening test. See id.
37 See id.; LUCKMANN & SORENSON, supra note 1, at
103 ("The test, called an
ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay), is not a diagnostic tool. It can detect
only the presence of antibodies to the AIDS virus, not the virus itself. The test is useful in screening donated blood for antibody.").
s, See Snyder, 144 NJ. at 273, 676 A.2d at 1038.
39 See
id.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 274, 676 A.2d at 1038.
42 See id.
43 SeeSnyder

v. Mekhjian, 244 NJ. Super. 281, 287, 582 A.2d 307, 310 (App. Div.
1990); see also Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div.
1974) (holding that blood suppliers will not be liable in strict liability because
blood is an unavoidably unsafe product).

44 See Snyder, 244 N.J. Super. at 297, 582 A.2d at 315. The Appellate Divisionjus-

tified limited discovery of a donor's records in order to protect confidentiality interests of the donor and to allow plaintiff redress from harm. See id.
45 See Snyder v. Mekhjian, 125 N.J. 328, 593 A.2d 318 (1991); see also Lincoln A.
Terzian, AIDS - Confidentiality - Individuals Infected With Acquired Immune Deficiency
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Thereafter, the trial court focused on the negligence claim
against the AABB and assessed its responsibility for the delay in implementing alternative testing of the blood supply. 47 The jury found
the AABB liable for not advising its member blood banks to utilize
surrogate testing." In addition, the jury determined that the AABB's
negligence was a substantial factor in Snyder's contraction of the
AIDS virus. 49 The appellate division affirmed.

°

The New Jersey Su-

preme Court granted the defendant's motion for certification' and
affirmed the lower court decisions. 2 In a six to one opinion written
by Justice Pollock, the court denied the AABB quasi-governmental or
charitable immunity and held it liable to the recipients of contaminated blood."
Several types of immunity are recognized under the law. The
United States Constitution provides that all senators and representatives will be immune from liability when involved in a speech or debate in either house." Although not directly stated in the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held that the President of
the United States is immune from civil suits for official acts while in
office because of the risk of affecting the functioning of the government. 55 That risk was addressed by the Court in Bradley v. Fisher.6 In
Syndrome (AIDS) Through Blood Transfusions May Obtain Limited Disclosure of Donor's
Identity During PretrialDiscovery - Snyder v. Mekhjian, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 999

(1992).
46 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 274, 676
A.2d at 1038.
47 See
id.
48

See id., 676 A.2d at 1038-39 (indicating that surrogate testing is the identifica-

tion of at-risk persons for a disease by testing for some characteristic that is common
in those persons who have already acquired the disease or are potential victims of
the disease).
49 See id., 676 A.2d at
1039.
50 See id. at 275, 676 A.2d
at 1039.
51 See Snyder v. Mekhjian, 126 N.J. 318, 598 A.2d
879 (1991).
52 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 307,
676 A.2d at 1055.
53 See id. at 273, 676 A.2d at 1038.
54 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6 cl.
1:
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place.

Id.

See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475-501 (1866) (concluding that
it is impermissible to issue an injunction against the President); see also Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-51 (1982) ("The President occupies a unique position
5

in the constitutional scheme ....

Because of the singular importance of the Presi-

dent's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits [resulting
from official acts of the President] would raise unique risks to the effective function-
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Bradley, the United States Supreme Court expanded the privilege of
immunity, holding that judges are not liable for damages in civil
suits based upon judicial acts, even when the acts are performed outside the scope of their authority.

7

The Court went so far as to permit

immunity even when the acts are committed with malice or are influenced by corruption.
Immunity was further extended in Spalding v. Vilas," in which
the Court held that the Postmaster General is not liable for his conduct in exercising his official duties. 60 In Spalding, the Postmaster
General had distributed a notice that injured an individual's reputation through allegedly malicious remarks.6 ' The Court recognized a
difference between actions taken by the Postmaster General outside
his scope of authority and those matters legally under his control
and responsibility. 6 The Court determined the Postmaster General's

official communication to be authorized under an act of Congress,
and since the Postmaster General did not exceed his authority by issuing a communication, the fact that the communication was malicious was immaterial.
After Spalding, immunity for acts authorized by Congress was
granted to lower-level federal officials in Barr v. Matteo." The Court
stated that immunity for private damage actions against government
officials for defamation and other torts was the result ofjudicial creation.6 5 Acknowledging the vast size of the government, the Court
held that because of the need to delegate authority to lower level officials, the privilege of immunity should extend to these officials.6
The Court reasoned that their functions were not any less important
than those of higher ranking officials.67
ing of government.").

But see Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1643 (1997)

(holding that the Constitution does not provide the President with temporary immunity from civil litigation resulting from events that occurred prior to taking office).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
See id. at
See id. at
59 161 U.S.
60 See id. at
61 See id. at
62 See id. at
63 See
id.
360 U.S.
65 See id. at
57

347, 351-52.
351, 354.
483 (1896).
498-99.
487-89.
498.
564 (1959).
569.

See id. at 572-73
67

See id. ("The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted
office, but an

expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.").
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The grant of immunity to lower level officials led to the grant of
immunity to private arbitrators who performed quasi-judicial functions in JJ Cravioliniv. Scholer & FullerAssociated Architects.68 The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed a ruling against an architect who had
served as an arbitrator in a dispute between an owner and contractor.69 The arbitrator claimed immunity from any liability because he
was acting as a judge in settling disputes. 0 The court reasoned that
the privilege of immunity was a matter of public policy and should
be provided to individuals who act as judges either in their official
capacity or by contract." The court refused to grant immunity to the
architects, however, and held that an individual can receive immunity only when acting
in the capacity of a judge, not when acting in
72
any other capacity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further defined the scope of immunity in Lundgren v. Freeman.75 The
Ninth Circuit reviewed a lawsuit against an arbitrator for willful and
malicious interference with the performance of a contract.74 The
court recognized that the arbitrator was entitled to immunity for performing a quasi-judicial function in a private agreement.7 5 The
court, however, rejected the notion that immunity extended to malicious and intentional acts to injure another party. 6 In so holding,
the Ninth Circuit declared that only acts performed in good faith are
protected and that the immunity was thus a qualified, not an absolute, privilege.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of immunity again in Butz v. Economou.78 In Butz, an action was brought
against the Department of Agriculture for wrongfully instituting an
administrative proceeding against a futures merchant and his company. 7 9 The Court specifically addressed the issue of immunity for

69

70

71
7
73
74

75
76

357 P.2d 611 (Ariz. 1961).
See id. at 613.

See id.
See id. at 613-14.
See id. at 614.

307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
See id. at 116.
Seeid. at 117-18.
See id. at 118.

See id.
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
79 See id. at 480. The respondent filed suit against the
Department of Agriculture because he alleged that it had investigated and conducted an administrative
proceeding against him in retaliation for criticizing the agency. See id.
77

78
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federal officials who exercised discretion in their job functions. 80
The Court analyzed three circumstances in making the decision to
grant officials of the Department of Agriculture absolute immunity.8'
First, the Court considered whether the officials were acting in the
capacity of a judge or a prosecutor.12 Second, the Court considered
whether the officials of the Department of Agriculture would be subject to lawsuits and other legal actions for their discretionary decisions. 3 Finally, the Court considered whether there were sufficient
procedural safeguards in place to prevent unconstitutional con4

duct.8

Since the officials of the Department of Agriculture were per-

forming a judicial function that would subject them to lawsuits from
losing parties based upon their discretionary decisions, and since
there were sufficient procedural safeguards in place, the Court determined that, like judges and prosecutors, the officials were entitled
to absolute immunity from lawsuits.8 "
The scope of immunity under quasi-governmental authority was
addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
using the Butz criteria in Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. v. National
Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.86 The National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) 87 has disciplinary responsibility under the broad
authority granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
from Congress.88 Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. (Austin) sued the
NASD for disciplinary actions, which were assessed by a review committee comprised of private individuals and were later reversed by
the NASD Board of Governors, alleging that the disciplinary actions
injured their reputation and business.89 The Fifth Circuit used the
Butz tripartite formula g° and assessed other circuit court decisions to
go See id. at 506 ("We consider... the need to protect officials who are required
to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.").

81 See id. at 510-13.

Seeid. at511-12.
83

See id. at 512.

84

See Butz, 438

85

U.S. at 512.
See id. at 513-14 ; see also supranotes 54-56 and accompanying text.
757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985).

See id. at 679-80 (stating that the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) is a self-regulatory agency that was registered by the Securities and Ex87

change Commission under the Maloney Act); see also Maloney Act (1938) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 to § 78o-5 (West 1994)).
See Austin, 757 F.2d at 680.

89 See id. at 684.
90 See id. at 688. The Fifth Circuit summarized the Butz test by stating:
Under this test, if: a) the official's functions share the characteristics
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determine whether immunity was available to the NASD for its quasigovernmental functions."' The court determined that the NASD disciplinary review board satisfied the first prong of Butz because members of the disciplinary board acted in a prosecutorial manner when
disciplining Austin and in a judicial role when making decisions on
the company's alleged wrongdoing. The Court further concluded
that the second prong was also satisfied in that the NASD members
on the disciplinary review board were likely to be sued for their actions against other NASD members." Butz's third prong was satisfied, the Court maintained, because there were sufficient safeguards
in place to ensure that the NASD disciplinary board did not act inappropriately." The Fifth Circuit also considered various arbitrator
cases that granted immunity to individuals who settled disputes between private parties and to self-regulatory bar associations for disciplinary review committees.95 The court reasoned that the NASD
should also have immunity because it would satisfy the Butz requirements and because it derived its immunity from the SEC, which is
granted immunity under statute 6 by Congress. 7 The Fifth Circuit
held that the individuals on the disciplinary review board and the
NASD had absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of
NASD's disciplinary authority."
Negligence actions99 are premised on the existence of a duty of
care; therefore, fairness and public policy must be considered when
of the judicial process; b) the official's activities are likely to result in
recriminatory lawsuits by disappointed parties; and c) sufficient safeguards exist in the regulatory framework to control unconstitutional
conduct, then that person's official conduct is absolutely immune
from civil liability.
Id.

91 See id. at 689-93.
92 See id. at 689.
93 See id.
94 See Austin, 757 F.2d
at 689.
95 See id. at 690-91. See generally Corey v. New York Stock
Exchange, 691 F.2d
1205 (6th Cir. 1982) (providing immunity to arbitrators); Simons v. Bellinger, 643
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (granting immunity to bar association disciplinary review

boards).
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680
(West 1994).
97 See Austin, 757 F.2d
at 692.
98 See id. at 693.

See generally, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). The elements necessary to establish a cause of

action for negligence are as follows:
plaintiff (duty); (2) a breach of the
lationship between the defendant's
(causation); and (4) actual damage

(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the
duty (breach); (3) a reasonably close causal rebreach and the resulting injury to the plaintiff
or loss resulting to the interests of the plaintiff
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imposing liability.'/° In reviewing Snyder, the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered the issues of fairness and public policy in its affirmance of the lower court decisions to impose liability on the
AABB.10'
The court stated that the blood bank community, including
hospitals, blood banks, and patients, relied upon the AABB to ensure
the safety of the blood supply.'0 2 In its analysis, the court determined
that patients who need blood depend on the blood bank organizations because the patients lack the means to protect themselves from
contaminated blood products.' 5 The court concluded that the
AABB had actively undertaken the responsibility of protecting the
blood supply.'O Further, the court explained that the AABB owed a
greater duty to protect and inform the public due to the considerable influence it possessed over the blood bank industry."
The
court also determined that the organization dominated blood bank
industry standards, and through its acts and omissions, communicated to blood banks, hospitals, and patients that AABB guidelines
represented the medically responsible industry standard for blood
bank operation. 1 6 Further, the court noted that the AABB established the standards for voluntary blood banks and its member blood
banks, lobbied for its member blood banks, and worked with governmental health agencies to develop blood bank policy.' 7 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the AABB's considerable influence essentially allowed it to promulgate the rules and procedures for
voluntary blood bank operations.' 8
The majority then considered the "severity and foreseeability" of
the risk that the transfusion of blood could transmit the AIDS vi(damages). See Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 142, 692 A.2d 97, 100 (App.
Div. 1997).
100 See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 292, 676 A.2d
1036, 1048 (1996). The court noted that the American Association of Blood Banks
(AABB) did not "directly obtain, process, or transfuse" the contaminated blood to
Snyder and thus the connection between Snyder and the AABB was that the blood
was handled according to AABB standards. See id.
101

See id.

102

See id. at 293, 676 A.2d at 1048.

105

See id.

104

See id. The court took notice of a March 31, 1983, AABB press release that

stated: "We would also like to assure the public that the chance of anyone acquiring
AIDS through a blood transfusion is remote .... Every precaution is being taken to
assure that each unit of blood transfused is the safest possible." Id.
51 id.
See
106 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 293, 676 A.2d at 1048.
107
108

See id.
See id.
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rus.'0 9 The court determined the severity of the risk according to the

dangers that were inherent in the transfusion of AIDS-infected blood
as related to the mortality and infection rates."' The court noted
that in 1984 the mortality rate for AIDS was forty percent, but that
after three years of infection the mortality rate increased to approximately one hundred percent."' The court also took into account that in 1984 the AIDS infection rate related to blood transfusions was increasing exponentially and, therefore, the potential of
being infected by contaminated blood was severe."'
The majority also found that the danger of contracting AIDS
through a blood transfusion was foreseeable. '" By 1983, evidence
suggested that AIDS could be transmitted through blood, the majority concluded."14 The court said that the AABB knew that the disease
was spreading rapidly and that donors who appeared healthy could
infect other individuals." 5 In addition, the court resolved that there
was ample evidence from the CDC and other medical experts that
AIDS could be transmitted through blood."' 6 The AABB argued that
the evidence was not conclusive and that, therefore, no duty existed
to screen blood." 7 The court held, however, that the AABB should
have known about the tremendous risks of AIDS transmission
through blood and that "foreseeability, not the conclusiveness, of
harm suffices to give rise to a duty of care." 8
The AABB argued that basic considerations of public policy and
fairness alleviated any duty of care owed to Snyder."9 Specifically, the
AABB argued that the lack of scientific certainty demonstrated that

109 See id.
110 See id. at 293-94, 676 A.2d at 1048.
II See id. at 294, 676 A.2d at 1048.
12 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 294, 676 A.2d at 1048-49.

The occurrence of transfu-

sion-related AIDS as reported by the CDC in December of 1983 was 38 cases, an increase from six cases in January of 1983. See id., 676 A.2d at 1049.
113 See id.
11

See id. (noting that in 1982, it was believed by epidemiologists at the CDC that

AIDS could be transmitted through blood).

115 See id.
116See id. The New England Journal of Medicine reported in January of 1984

that it believed that AIDS could be transmitted through blood and blood products,
confirming the CDC's belief that AIDS could be transmitted through blood. See
generally James W. Curran, et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated
with Transfusions,310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 69 (1984).
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 294, 676 A.2d at 1049.
"1 Id.
119 See id.
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no special duty to recommend blood testing existed."
Indeed, by
imposing such a duty, it would violate fundamental dictates of fairness and also would hinder the AABB's constitutional right to be active in the political process.' 2 ' Citing the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,' 2 which holds that First Amendment' "2 rights allow commercial
interests to lobby the government without violating the antitrust
laws, the AABB argued that by exposing it to tort liability, the court
would interfere with the AABB's right to lobby the government on
the subject of AIDS transmission through blood.2 4 The majority rejected this defense, finding that the AABB was not liable for lobbying
activities, but that the organization was liable for not recommending
25
surrogate testing and other precautionary measures.1
The AABB further argued that by imposing a duty, the court's
decision would conflict with public policy because the AABB would
be discouraged from entering into public debate on matters of public health, which would detrimentally inhibit scientific discussion and
advancement.

26

The threat of liability, the AABB explained, would

impair the medical community and would result in the acceptance of
lower standards. 2 7 The AABB also asserted that it refused to adopt

120

See id.

See id. at 295, 676 A.2d at 1049.
See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972). The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine was derived from two United States Supreme Court cases. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U.S. 127
(1961). The doctrine holds that citizens and groups have the right to access government agencies, the legislature, and the courts in order to petition the government for laws on their behalf. See CaliforniaMotor, 404 U.S. at 510-11. The doctrine
recognizes the First Amendment right to association and to petition the government so that organizations can advocate on their own behalf without violating the
antitrust laws. See id. at 511.
123 See U.S. CONs-r. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
12
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 295, 676 A.2d at 1049.
25 See id. at 296, 676 A.2d at 1050. Although the United States Supreme Court
121
1

has not extended the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine beyond the scope of antitrust,
some lower federal courts have utilized the doctrine in tort liability cases. See id. at
295, 676 A.2d at 1049. See generally South Dakota v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 880
F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in a tortious interference with contract case).
126 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 296, 676 A.2d
at 1050.
1
See id. (stating the AABB's argument that by imposing liability, medical
researchers would be deterred from introducing new methods and standards due to
the fear of liability).
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testing recommendations because the organization28 feared that such
measures would reduce the available blood supply.'
The court rejected the AABB's arguments, explaining that the
organization should never have lost focus on its primary mission to ensure the safety of the blood supply." When weighing the benefits of debate on medical issues against the horrific risk of contracting AIDS, the court reasoned that imposing liability on the organization was justified. 0
The majority then considered the AABB's argument that no
duty arose from the AABB's advisory role to the government on regulation of blood banks.' The court determined that this advisory role
amounted to control over the voluntary blood bank industry.'3 2 The
court reasoned that acts such as the accreditation process that the
AABB imposed on member blood banks and the New Jersey Department of Health regulations that required blood banks to comply
with FDA and AABB rules amounted to more than an advisory role
for the organization.' 3 The court determined that the AABB did not
merely make suggestions for practices in the industry, but actually
controlled the member blood banks.""
The AABB argued that it should not owe the public a duty of
care because it played a major role in the establishment of public
policy.'3 5 The majority rejected the argument, holding that the
AABB essentially operated for its own interests, not those of the public.' 6 The court noted that the AABB had a significant financial posi128

See id.

12

See id.

1SO See

id.

See id. at 296-97, 676 A.2d at 1050. In the court's analysis of the AABB's relationship to governmental regulation it stated that "[iln 1984, the AABB was more
131

than a trade association. It was the governing body of a significantly self-regulated
industry." See id. at 296, 676 A.2d at 1050.
132
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 296, 676 A.2d at 1050. The AABB instructed its member
blood banks on methods of screening, obtaining, and distributing blood. See id. at
296-97, 676 A.2d at 1050.

See id. (noting that "if a blood bank failed the annual AABB inspection on the
taking of medical histories, that bank could lose its license to operate in New Jersey."); see also NJ. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8 § 8-5.2 (1984) (the DOH regulation that required blood banks to comply with both FDA and AABB standards); NJ. ADMIN.
CODE. tit. 8 § 8-1.4(b) (1984) (the DOH accepted the AABB inspection reports to
satisfy the requirements for license renewal because the AABB standards were more
strict than the FDA's).
133

:' See Snyder, 144 NJ. at 297, 676 A.2d at 1050.

35 See id. (stressing that the AABB was a "major player
in both state and federal
government in setting blood policy").
"3

See id.
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tion in the industry and that in 1984 the voluntary blood banks
earned revenues of about one billion dollars.' 7
In addition, the majority rejected the dissent's position that because the AABB played a role in establishing public policy, the entity
should be allowed qualified immunity as a quasi-governmental
agency. " ' The court reasoned that a decision to grant a private organization qualified immunity as a quasi-governmental agency must
be considered by looking at the association's operations and the relationship it has to an agency of government.' The majority considered prior qualified immunity cases and concluded that the privilege
rested upon a governmental grant of authority that created a quasigovernmental entity.'" The court compared the AABB with the
NASD, the self-regulatory agency to which Congress granted power
to maintain compliance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934s4
and certain ethical standards.14 The majority concluded that in all
the cases in which organizations were given
express government
4
power, the organizations enjoyed immunity. 1
The majority also carefully analyzed Berends v. City of Atlantic
City,'" which the dissent relied upon in its opinion endorsing a grant

of qualified immunity. 145 In Berends, Pan Am Management Systems,
Inc. (Pan Am) operated the Atlantic City Municipal Airport when
there was a crash on one of the runways.'" The court ruled that Pan
See id. Gilbert Clark, AABB director said, "think of us as tax-exempt rather
than not-for-profit. We have to make a profit." Id. The majority concluded that
"[b]lood is big business." See id.
See id. at 298, 676 A.2d at 1051 (explaining that a quasi-governmental entity
that has qualified immunity will be held liable for negligence only if it does not act
137

in good faith).
See id.

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 298, 676 A.2d at 1051.
See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 757 F.2d 676
(5th Cir. 1985). The NASD was formed under the Maloney Over-the-Counter Market Act of 1938, which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in which
Congress granted the NASD and other organizations the power to maintain ethical
standards and to enforce securities regulations. See id. at 679-80.
142 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 298, 676 A.2d at 1051; Austin,
757 F.2d at 680.
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 298-99, 676 A.2d at 1051. The court noted:
Unlike governmental agencies, the AABB was not created by statute.
It does not act pursuant to a government mandate. Nor is it accountable either to the public or another branch of government. No matter
how much power the AABB exercised, the inescapable fact is that it is
not a governmental agency.
Id. at 298, 676 A.2d at 1050.
144 263 N.J. Super. 66, 621 A.2d 972 (App.
Div. 1993).
:45 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 299, 676 A.2d at 1051.
46 See id.; see also Berends, 263 N.J. Super.
at 69-70, 621 A.2d at 974.
140
141
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Am was not negligent based on the protection of governmental immunity.147 The majority distinguished Berends by pointing out that
Pan Am operated the airport under a contract with Atlantic City.'"
Further, the court recognized that Pan Am also operated under federal and state regulations.'49 Significantly, the court noted that the
AABB was not operating under an express contract with any government agency.'
By comparison, the court noted that the AABB's
policies and regulations exceeded the government standards and,
further, the NewJersey Department of Health (DOH) mandated that
blood banks be accredited by the AABB.'' The majority also noted
that the AABB's unique status in the blood industry allowed the organization to set its own standards and make independent decisions
on surrogate blood testing.1 5 2 The court also distinguished Berends,
noting that Pan Am was part of a "multi-agency decision-making
process" that was public. 5' In contrast, the court concluded that the
AABB's internal review process and refusal to implement surrogate
testing standards for its member blood banks left the organization
open to greater liability.-"
The majority further rejected comparisons between the AABB
and entities that enjoy qualified governmental immunity.' 5 Recognizing that the AABB performs functions of the government through
its establishment and enforcement of industry guidelines, the court
conceded that the organization acts to protect the safety of the public blood supply. 5 6 Further, the court acknowledged that the DOH
relied upon the AABB recommendations and procedures, and that
the FDA encouraged blood banks to follow AABB standards.'57 The
court discounted these factors in denying the AABB governmental
immunity, however, because the organization had no contract with
the government and possessed no government authority entitling it

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 300, 676 A.2d at 1052.
See id.
149 See
id.
150 See id.
151 See id.; supranote 133 for discussion of the NewJersey DOH regulations.
"2
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 300, 676 A.2d at 1052.
153 See id.
15
See id. (stating that "[nlothing other than its own self-interest and tragically
bad judgment prevented the AABB from recommending surrogate testing").
See id. at 301, 676 A.2d at 1052.
156 See id.
157
See id.; 21 C.F.R. § 606.100(d) (1984) (allowing blood banks to depend on
AABB procedures if they are as strict as the FDA's).
:'7

148
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to qualified immunity.'58 The majority firmly held that merely because the AABB acted like a government agency, that did not mean it
was a government agency.159
The majority stated that there was no government management
of the AABB and that the AABB did not operate solely for the public
interest. 6 The court stated that government agencies are subject to
public scrutiny, which provides the public with input into the decision-making process.' In addition, the court held that government
agencies are required to provide access to their records, are subject
62
to judicial review, and hold meetings that are open to the public.
In contrast, the court noted, the AABB made its decisions in private
and its discussions included areas beyond the public scope, such as
the 6potential for liability for the contamination of the blood supply.

The majority also rejected the AABB's qualified immunity claim
as a quasi-governmental entity because, unlike the AABB, entities
that qualify for immunity are subject to procedural safeguards.'"
The court concluded that safeguards such as judicial review, contract
terms, statutory mandates, or state inspection are necessary for qualifled immunity. The court found that the AABB is a private organization that is not subject to any of these controlling forces and,
therefore, it is not entitled to qualified immunity.'" The majority
also rejected the dissent's suggestion of remanding the case to the
trial court to assess whether the AABB acted in bad faith
because the
67
AABB did not petition the court for such a remand.
"' See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 301, 676 A.2d at 1052.
,9 See id. at 302, 676 A.2d at 1053.
160

See id.

See id. The New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act provides to the public
notice of meetings and the opportunity to attend those meetings. See NJ. STAT. ANN. §
10:4-6 to -21 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997). The NewJersey Administrative Procedure
Act establishes procedures for the public to participate in the establishment of
rules. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-1 to -15 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
:62
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 302, 676 A.2d at 1053.
63
See id. at 302-03, 676 A.2d at 1053.
See id. at 303, 676 A.2d at 1053.
16 See id. See generally Citrano v. Allen Correctional Ctr., 891 F.
Supp. 312, 317
(W.D. La. 1995) (holding that a private corporation that operated a prison was entifled to qualified immunity for operating under a contract with the state that required the corporation to follow contractual and statutory requirements in addition
to state monitoring and inspection).
166 See Snyder, 144 NJ. at 303, 676 A.2d at 1053.
167 See id. at 303-04, 676 A.2d at 1053. The dissent suggested a remand to
determine whether the AABB acted with malice or bad faith and found that qualified
immunity was appropriate for the AABB. See id. at 324, 676 A.2d at 1064 (Garibaldi,
161
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The majority also rejected the argument of the amicus curiae,
the American Society of Association Executives,' that the AABB
should be immune from liability as a public entity.6 9 Under the New
Jersey Tort Claims Act, 170 a public entity would be entitled to immu7
nity for an injury that results from the acts of the public entity.
The majority held however, that the AABB did not qualify under the
statutory definition of a public entity.7 7 The court stated that simply
because the entity assumed a regulatory role for the blood banking7
industry, that did not make it a public entity entitled to immunity. In addition, the court recognized that the legislature did not expressly empower the AABB to perform a government purpose and
that the AABB did not operate under a contract with or the supervision of a public entity. 174 Finally, the majority rejected any extension
of governmental status to the AABB even though the DOH regulations mandated that blood banks follow AABB procedures and accreditation processes.175
In order to qualify for charitable immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity statute, an organization must show that it is
established solely for charitable purposes. 176 The majority concluded
J., dissenting). The AABB did not argue for qualified immunity. See id. at 303-04,
676 A,2d at 1053. An amicus curiae brief from the American Society of Association
Executives suggested that the AABB was entitled to qualified immunity if it was determined that it acted in good faith. See id. at 304, 676 A.2d at 1053. The majority
stated that "[a] remand for a retrial under a standard that the AABB never urged
would be an injustice to a plaintiff with so tenuous a hold on life." See id.
18 See DONALD P. BOYDEN AND ROBERT WILSON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES,
AND PUBLICATONS DIRECTORY 51 (1988). The American Society of Association Ex-

ecutives is a professional society of paid executives engaged in the management of
local, state, and national trade, professional, and business organizations. See id.
The purpose of the society is to provide "an international medium for: the proper
objectives, functions, and activities of associations; the basic principles of association
organization; the legal aspects of association activity; policies relating to association
management; efficient methods, procedures and techniques of association management; the responsibilities and professional standards of association executives."
Id.
169 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 304, 676 A.2d at 1053.
70 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3 (West 1992).
7
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 304, 676 A.2d at 1053-54; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:23(a) (West 1992) ("A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise ofjudgment or discretion vestedin the entity[.]").
7
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 304-05, 676 A.2d at 1054 (stating that a public entity includes "the State, and any county, municipality, district, public authority, public
agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in the State").
1

See id.

174

See id. at 304, 676 A.2d at 1054.
See id. at 305, 676 A.2d at 1054.
See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987) ("No nonprofit corpo-

175
1
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that although the AABB accomplishes many social and charitable
works for the community, it was not established exclusively for charitable purposes.1" The court found that the organization operates for
its members' interests and, therefore, does not meet the statutory
7
1
requirement of being organized solely for charitable purposes.1
Justice Garibaldi's dissent argued that the AABB should receive
qualified immunity' 79 as a quasi-governmental entity. 8 ' Recognizing
that the AABB owed the public a duty of care, the dissent opined
that public policy dictates that, due to its regulatory nature, the
AABB should enjoy qualified immunity."" The justice further reexempt the ormarked that the AABB's good faith conduct 8should
2
ganization from liability for mere negligence.
The dissent agreed with the majority that the interest of citizens
to be protected from an infected blood supply should be balanced
against the public policy prohibiting imposition of liability on an organization that performed regulatory functions similar to those of a
government agency. 8 ' Justice Garibaldi considered the Federal Tort
ration, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall ... be liable to respond in damages to any person
who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association . . . ."). See generally Heffelfinger v. Town of Morristown, 209 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 507 A.2d 761, 763 (Law Div. 1985) (holding that
trustees of town common that maintained park for the benefit of the public were
immune from liability under the Charitable Immunity Act because it was organized
"exclusively" for charitable purposes).
177 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 305,
676 A.2d at 1054.
178 See id. at 305-06, 676
A.2d at 1054.
179 See id. at 308, 321, 676 A.2d at 1055, 1062 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (stating
that qualified immunity relieves the organization of some liability absent the demonstration of bad faith or malice).
ISOSee id. at 308, 676 A.2d at 1055 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
181 See id., 676 A.2d at 1055-56 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
18
See id. at 307, 676 A.2d at 1055 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
stated that "the imposition of a duty is the conclusion of a rather complex analysis
that considers the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk - that is, its
foreseeability and severity - and the impact the imposition of a duty would have on
public policy." Id. (citing Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 503, 643 A.2d 600, 604
(1994)).
183 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 308, 676 A.2d at 1056 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
The
justice noted:
The decision to grant immunity to those working to promulgate governmental rules is based on a balancing of 'myriad and weighty
[factors] on both sides of the argument. Resolution of the issue involves a balancing of the citizen's interest in having a remedy for a
wrong suffered and society's interest in attracting qualified persons to
public office....
Id. (quoting Centennial Land & Dev. Co. v. Township of Medford, 165 N.J. Super.
220, 227, 397 A.2d 1136, 1139-40 (Law Div. 1979)).
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Claims Act," 4 which grants absolute immunity to the government
5
and its officials for acting or failing to act on a discretionary duty.'
Assessing the facts of the blood bank industry, the dissent noted that
neither the FDA nor the DOH, which had the responsibility to regulate the industry, adopted surrogate testing as an appropriate standard in the industry. Yet, the justice noted that both organizations
would receive absolute immunity for their discretionary decision not
to adopt these precautionary measures. 18 7 Further, the dissent considered the New Jersey statutes that remove liability for decisions
made by public entities and for discretionary decisions made by government officials.'" Justice Garibaldi argued that public policy justified granting immunity because the fear of lawsuits would inhibit individuals and organizations from working to benefit the public
health.'89
In comparison with government agencies, the dissent acknowledged that the AABB is a private organization that does not fall under the definition of a charitable organization or a government
agency.'90 Rather, the justice recognized the AABB as an organization that undertook the governmental responsibility of regulating
the blood bank industry.'9 ' The dissent reasoned that although the
184

See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (West 1994).

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 309, 676 A.2d at 1056 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting);
28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (West 1994) (permitting immunity for "the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty").
185

'5

See Snyder, 144 NJ. at 308, 676 A.2d at 1056 (Garibaldi,J, dissenting).

See id. at 308-09, 676 A.2d at 1056 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
in See id. at 310, 676 A.2d at 1056 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); see also NJ. STAT.
87

ANN. § 59:2-3 (West 1992) (absolute immunity for public entities for discretionary

decisions); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-2 (West 1992) (absolute immunity for government employees for discretionary decisions). Justice Garibaldi cited Barr v. Mateo,
360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959), stating that "the threat of lawsuits 'would consume time
and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the
threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government.'" Snyder, 144 N.J. at 310, 676 A.2d at 1057
(Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (quoting Barr, 360 U.S. at 570); see also supra notes 63-66
and accompanying text.
189
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 311, 676 A.2d at 1057 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). Justice
Garibaldi stated that:
[olrdinarily, the threat of liability will deter a person from acting if
the costs outweigh the benefits because the actor will be forced to pay
those costs in a lawsuit; if the benefits outweigh the costs, the actor will
proceed knowing that it will not be held liable and will enjoy the
benefits. As a result, the optimal outcome is achieved.
Id. at 310, 676 A.2d at 1057 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (summarizing Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972)).
190
See id. at 311, 676 A.2d at 1057 (GaribaldiJ., dissenting).
191 See id.
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statutes do not provide immunity to the AABB, the statutes are premised upon public policy and can serve as a basis to expand common
law immunity to the AABB.'9 2 The justice reasoned that because immunity granted to government officials is based on the same public
policy grounds, an expansion of immunity to the AABB would be
appropriate.'"
The dissent noted that the AABB is an organization comprised
of doctors and volunteers who work for the public and the blood
banking industry. 94 The AABB performs regulatory functions and
accredits member blood banks that comply with standards established by uncompensated volunteers who donate their skills and
medical knowledge. 99 The dissent took into account that blood
banks in NewJersey cannot operate without being accredited by the
AABB and the FDA as per DOH regulations.' 96 The justice noted
that the DOH relied upon the AABB to establish standards and essentially to regulate New Jersey blood banks.'97 More importantly,
the dissent recognized that the AABB was involved at the federal
level in establishing policy and standards and was influential in 1984
when the FDA did not adopt the surrogate testing recommendation
of the CDC.'9 9 The dissent determined that the AABB was not merely
a participant in establishing blood bank standards, but that the entity's influence and decisions were "directly intertwined with, and to
a large extent constituted, governmental regulation."'"
Justice Garibaldi explained that when a nonprofit organization
performs a quasi-governmental function, it should be granted quali192

See id.

198

See id.

(quoting Crawn v. Campo, 136 NJ. 494, 504, 643 A.2d 600, 605
(1994), which stated that "statutory immunities are reflective of public policy and
may serve as a guide to the evolution of related common law immunities").
See id. at 311-12, 676 A.2d at 1057 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
194
See id. at 312, 676 A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
,95 See Snyder, 144 NJ. at 312-13, 676 A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
1% See id. at 313, 676 A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The New Jersey
DOH required blood banks to follow FDA and AABB procedures for obtaining donor medical histories and physical exams. See id. The DOH accepted AABB inspections to satisfy DOH inspection requirements. See id. The justice noted that some
states have decided not to regulate the blood bank industry and have deferred to
the AABB to establish standards and to regulate blood banks. See id. at 312, 676
A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
197
See id. at 313, 676 A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
Id. at 314, 676 A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). Plaintiff witnesses who
attended the January 4, 1983 meeting with the CDC Task Force "testified that the
AABB caused the federal response that rejected surrogate testing and direct screening in favor of indirect screening and educational efforts." Id. at 313, 676 A.2d at
1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
199
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fled immunity. 2°° By not granting qualified immunity, the justice argued that imposing private liability would work as a disincentive and
would cause fewer private organizations and individuals to volunteer
for public service.20 Alternatively, Justice Garibaldi reasoned that the
government, by granting qualified immunity to nonprofit organizations engaged in quasi-governmental functions, would ensure the
good faith establishment of regulations and guidelines.0 2 These
regulations and guidelines, the justice explained, would best protect
20
the public well-being. '
In support of its position, the dissent cited Berends, °0 in which
the court held that Pan Am enjoyed absolute immunity despite its
role in the governmental decision to keep a runway closed that ultimately caused an airplane to crash. 2 5 The Berends court held that
private organizations acting in concert with a city should be protected by immunity. 26 The dissent reasoned that the AABB made a
significant contribution to government regulation of the blood bank
industry.0 7 Therefore, the dissent reasoned, it would be inconsistent
200
201

See id. at 314, 676 A.2d at 1058 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 314, 676 A.2d at 1058-59 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)

(noting that the individuals who volunteered for the AABB were from "top academic and research institutions"). Dr. Bove, the Chairman of the AABB, was a
member of the faculty at Yale University and the Associate Director of Clinical
Laboratories at Yale-New Haven Hospital. See id. at 312, 676 A.2d at 1058
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Dr. Harold Oberman, a defense witness and member of
the AABB, was a professor of pathology and laboratory director at the University of
Michigan. See id. Dr. Carol Bell was a clinical professor of pathology at the University of Southern California and at University of California at Irvine, in addition to
being the Director of Laboratories at Brotman Medical Center in California. See id.
See id. at 314, 676 A.2d at 1059 (Garibaldi,J, dissenting). Thejustice noted:
Granting immunity to nonprofit associations who have assumed some
governmental duties will ensure that, undaunted by the prospect of
litigation expense and potential damage awards, they will continue to
perform the essential public service that they alone are well-positioned
to undertake: the good-faith development of industry standards to
protect the public health and safety.
Id.
203
204
205
206
207

See id.

263 N.J. Super. 66, 621 A.2d 972 (App. Div. 1993).
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 314-15, 676 A.2d at 1059 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id. at 315, 676 A.2d at 1059 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id. (citing Berends, 263 N.J. Super. at 81, 621 A.2d at 981). Justice Garib-

aldi cited:
Pan An engaged in and made a significant contribution to the process which, as we have held, shields the city from liability. It would be
anomalous to punish Pan Am for postponing the reopening of runway
4-22 when the postponement resulted from its participation in a
thoughtful and professional multiagency evaluation process upon
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with Berends to hold the AABB liable for its similar participation in
government regulations. °8
The dissent dismissed the majority's reliance upon an express
contract in Berends.209 Justice Garibaldi pointed out that the decision
in Berends was not based upon the contract with the City of Atlantic
City because the existence of a contract was not in evidence at the
trial.2 0 In addition, the justice rejected the distinction that Pan Am
operated under stringent federal and state laws whereas the blood
banking industry functioned under federal and state laws that were
lenient.21 ' The dissent argued that the court lacked the expertise to
make decisions about blood bank standards.
The justice further
commented that the judiciary should not pass judgment on what are
essentially policy decisions.1
Furthermore, the dissent rejected the court's position that the
decisions made in Berends were made through public hearings and
joint agency participation, whereas the decisions made by the AABB
were private and closed to the public.1 4 The dissent noted that the
AABB's disagreement with the CDC on surrogate testing was voiced
at theJanuary 4, 1984, meeting, which included representatives from
the "CDC, FDA, National Institutes of Health,.AABB, American Red
Cross, Council for Community Blood Banks, National Hemophilia
Foundation, National Gay Task Force, New York Health Department,
San Francisco Health Department, and other organizations." 5 The
dissent commented that the process of deciding upon whether to institute surrogate testing was remarkably similar to the decision by
Pan Am to keep the runway closed. ' The dissent stated that the
which the city's immunity is founded.
Id. (quoting Berends, 263 N.J. Super. at 83, 621 A.2d at 981-82).
20

See id.

09 See id.
210

See id.

211

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 315, 676 A.2d at 1059 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).

212

See id.

See id. Justice Garibaldi stated:
The majority suggests that Pan Am was granted immunity because, in
this Court's view, airport regulations are better than blood banking
regulations. This assertion, without a shred of proof, lends added
credence to the legislative concern that the judiciary should not
'secondguess' policy decisions because the courts 'are ill-equipped to
interfere' with such decisions.
Id. (quoting Costa v.Josey, 83 N.J. 49, 55, 415 A.2d 337, 340 (1980)).
214 Se id.at 316,676 A.2d at 1059 (Gaibaldi,J., dissenting).
15 Id., 676 A.2d at 1059-60 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
21s

216
See id., 676 A.2d at 1060 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) ("[T]he AABB, like Pan
Am, should be granted immunity as a result of its participation in the multi-agency
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AABB's decision was made in conjunction with governmental
2 1 7 agencies and, therefore, the AABB should be granted immunity.
Justice Garibaldi relied on other cases in which courts have
granted immunity to private organizations that have performed
quasi-governmental functions in good faith. 8 Justice Garibaldi
noted that the Seventh Circuit in Sherman v. Four County Counseling
Center,2 9 held that a private hospital that provided a patient with the
same care a public hospital would provide deserved immunity because it "'fulfill[ed] a public duty.'"" ° The dissent reasoned that
qualified immunity is justified to encourage private organizations to
aid the government.2' By comparison, the justice argued that if the
DOH and the FDA are not liable for the decision not to2 institute surrogate testing, then the AABB should also not be liable. 2
The dissent also rejected the majority's conclusion that only private organizations operating under an express grant of authority
from the government should receive immunity.2 " The dissent noted
that DOH regulations absorbed the guidelines established by the
AABB and that the FDA allowed blood banks to follow AABB regulations in lieu of FDA regulations so long as they were in accordance
with FDA rules."4
Such conduct, Justice Garibaldi explained,
amounted to a tacit acceptance of the AABB as a government advisor.2 " Justice Garibaldi concluded that the FDA and the DOH had

granted the AABB power to set standards and promulgate procedures for blood banks and, therefore,
the AABB decisions should be
26
insulated from private liability suits

decision-making process from which the government's immunity is derived.").
217 See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 316, 676 A.2d at 1060 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
2 8 See id. at 316-18, 676 A.2d at 1060-61 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
219

987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993).

220

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 316, 676 A.2d at 1060 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)

(quoting Sherman, 987 F.2d at 406).

The Seventh Circuit determined that Four

County Counseling Center was performing a public duty. See Sherman, 987 F.2d at
405. The Sherman court also took into account that denying qualified immunity
could result in the private hospital not accepting involuntary patients and could
discourage public service, thereby placing an increased burden on public resources.
See id. at 406.
221
M2

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 316, 676 A.2d at 1060 (GaribaldiJ., dissenting).

See id.

224

See id. at 319, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id. at 318, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).

25

See id. at 319, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J, dissenting).

226

See id. Justice Garibaldi criticized the majority by stating, "The majority seeks

223

to have it both ways: finding a duty of care and liability because of the governmental authority delegated to the AABB, but then denying immunity because of a perceived lack of governmental authority." Id.
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Justice Garibaldi also stated that "'immunity does not depend
upon the source of the decision-making power but rather upon the
nature of that power."'" The dissent rejected the idea that a legislative grant of power was the basis of immunity, rather, it embraced the
position that immunity should be based upon endorsement of discretionary policy decisions. 22 In support of this premise, the dissent
relied upon C.R.S. v. United States,2 in which the court granted immunity to the military for its adoption of FDA and AABB standards
not because of the legislative grant of power, but because the court
deemed that it would be inappropriate to review a discretionary policy decision."0
The dissent reasoned that public policy considerations provided
a justification for quasi-governmental immunity.2 3 1 Justice Garibaldi
referred toJJ Craviolini,2s2 in which the Arizona Supreme Court recognized immunity for arbitrators who settle private construction contract disputes absent a governmental grant of authority.2 "

Justice

Garibaldi also explained that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has granted immunity to individuals who make decisions in accordance with private contracts and act in a "quasijudicial capacity. " 2 4 Based on these decisions, the dissent concluded

Snyder, 144 N.J. at 319, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (quoting
Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (1982)).
28
See id.

11 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993).
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 319, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing
C.R.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 1993)). The Eighth Circuit in
22
2

C.R.S. stated:
[Tihe complicated public health issues surrounding AIDS were compounded here because at the time the decision to adopt FDA/AABB
screening procedures was made, the medical community still had imperfect knowledge regarding many aspects of the disease. In short,
the issue of what screening procedures to adopt is precisely the type of
policy-bound decision that Congress intended to insulate from judicial scrutiny through the discretionary function exception.
C.RS., 11 F.3d. at 797. The discretionary function exception is an exception to the
Federal Torts Claims Act that provides immunity to the government for discretionary decisions made as part of a federal agency or as a government employee. See id.

at 795; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (West 1994).
231
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 319, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
232 357 P.2d 611 (Ariz. 1961).
2

234

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 319, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id. at 319-20, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (citing Lundgren

v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962)).
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that a legislative grant of power does not confer immunity.25 Rather,
immunity arises from the protection of discretionary decisions.3
Justice Garibaldi carefully assessed the level of immunity that
should be granted to a private organization.2 7 The justice reasoned
that courts have granted absolute immunity to individuals and organizations, as they would to a government entity, when the entities
have performed governmental tasks. 2" Although some courts have
granted absolute immunity to private entities working in the public
interest, Justice Garibaldi stated that public policy considerations
dictate that organizations such as the AABB should be granted only
qualified immunity. 219 Justice Garibaldi asserted that qualified immunity would grant private organizations protection for decisions
made in good faith and those discretionary decisions made in furtherance of public policies.2 '
The dissent opined that granting qualified immunity to organizations that work in the public interest would strike an acceptable
balance by protecting private organizations from liability in their
pursuit of the public good while permitting a remedy for injured
parties when the organization acts with malice or bad faith.24' Unlike
government, which works solely for the public interest and receives
absolute immunity, the dissent noted that an organization such as
the AABB works for the industry's interest as well as the public interest.2 42 Logically, Justice Garibaldi explained, the AABB should receive immunity for its participation in public health decisions.245
Granting qualified immunity in this context, Justice Garibaldi ex235
23
237
2"

239
240

See id. at 320, 676 A.2d at 1061 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id.
See id., 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id.
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 320, 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).

See id.

See id. at 320-21, 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
stated that "[qlualified immunity is 'the best attainable accommodation of competing values,' because it simultaneously preserves both the incentive of private associations to continue developing industry rules and the right of injured parties to seek
relief in extreme cases where malice or bad faith can be demonstrated." Id.
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
242 See id. at 321, 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J.,
dissenting).
243
See id. Thejustice stated:
Liability for negligence, without any immunity ... might also deter effective decisions - because most of the benefits of an AABB decision
are enjoyed by the public, AABB might hesitate from taking some appropriate actions if its own benefit would not be as great as the overall
cost, even if the overall benefit exceeds that cost.
241
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plained, would create a system in which decisions could be protected, but organizations would remain liable for bad faith or profitmotivated decisions. 2" The dissent further rejected the majority's
conclusion that denying immunity did not penalize the AABB for an
incorrect decision.24 5 By imposing a duty of care on the AABB and
refusing the organization immunity, Justice Garibaldi noted that the
court's decision would reduce
2 6 the willingness of private organiza-

tions to assist the government. 4
Justice Garibaldi also considered the time period in which the
decision not to institute surrogate testing was made.4 7 In 1984, the
justice recognized, no consensus existed as to the effectiveness of
surrogate testing.4 8 In addition, the dissent explained, decisions
made by health officials were influenced by concerns about possible
blood shortages. 24" The dissent also noted that no governmental
agency adopted the surrogate testing program recommended by the
CDC. 210 In short, the justice concluded that no consensus existed in
the medical community about the efficacy of surrogate testing. 5 ' In
addition to conflicting opinions in the health care industry regard244

See id. (stating that qualified immunity creates a "sufficient check against deci-

sions that are clearly wrong and motivated by profit").
245
246
247

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 321, 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id. at 322, 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
See id. ("Admittedly, the decision reached by AABB and the government

health agencies appears negligent with the perspective of 20/20 hindsight.").
248 See id.
249 See id. The justice noted that those opposed to surrogate testing had serious
concerns about the consequences of instituting surrogate testing. See id. Concerns
included the exclusion of
a half-million blood donors who did not have HIV, causing blood
shortages and panic as hundreds of thousands of people who had engaged in no high-risk activity would fear that they had contracted
HIV... [and] members of high-risk groups would come and give
blood under the impression that they could then find out whether
they had HIV.
Id. Since the core test was not completely reliable, the fear was that more blood
would be contaminated. See id. The dissent also noted that when the ELISA test
was introduced, alternate test centers were established to fulfill the need of individuals to know if they were infected with HIV without the risk of infecting the
blood supply. See id.
250 See id. at 322-23, 676 A.2d at 1063 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting) (noting that a
plaintiff expert "testified that surrogate testing was not required by any state or federal agency, or by any other country in the world.").
15
See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 323, 676 A.2d at 1063 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). Doctor
Donald Louria testified that surrogate testing was not adopted because there were
no articles in peer-reviewjournals that supported surrogate testing and, in addition,
articles about surrogate testing concluded that this measure would be an ineffective
and "unsound public policy." See id.
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ing surrogate testing, Justice Garibaldi noted that despite Dr. Francis's Task Force's 2 2 support of surrogate testing, the CDC itself did
not recommend surrogate testing.22 In fact, the justice commented,
in 1984 the cost-benefit analysis of surrogate testing did not indicate
whether the benefits of surrogate testing would outweigh the costs.2 "
There is a significant concern about maintaining the safety and
availability of the blood supply. Numerous individuals need blood
regularly and others require it as a life-saving measure in emergency
situations. At the same time, the dictates of public policy mandate
that negligent parties should be accountable for their breaches of
duty. Dictates of fairness and policy must be carefully weighed, however, when one of the parties is an organization that makes a significant contribution to the public well-being, as do blood bank associations.
The AABB most certainly had a duty of care to ensure the safety
of the blood supply at its member blood banks, a responsibility that
it voluntarily accepted for its own benefit as well as that of society.
During a time of great uncertainty, the AABB made a discretionary
decision in conjunction with government agencies that regulated the
blood supply, which, in hindsight, was incorrect.2" As a result of that
decision, the AABB was held liable for negligence. In contrast, the
CDC, which suggested but did not adopt standards for blood-supply
safety, was immune from liability.
The dictates of fairness and public policy did not prevail in Snyder. A grant of qualified immunity would have struck the appropriate
balance between holding parties accountable for breach of the duty
of care in situations involving bad faith and granting immunity for
discretionary decisions made in good faith. The majority's decision
may, unfortunately, chill efforts of socially beneficial organizations
that partner with the government to benefit society.25 As Justice Gar-

ibaldi stated, "the majority's failure to grant immunity to the AABB
ensures that non-governmental agencies will be increasingly unwilling to participate in the regulatory process and assist government in
policy formulation at a time when government and the public increasingly rely on such organizations to develop industry stan-

252

See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CDC

AIDS Task Force.
253

254

55
256

See Snyder, 144 N.J. at 323, 676 A.2d at 1063 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).

See id.
See id. at 322, 676 A.2d at 1063 (Garibaldi,J, dissenting).
See id., 676 A.2d at 1062 (Garibaldi,J, dissenting).
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dards."2 7 A fear of liability would only stifle altruistic forces and
place additional limits on the likelihood that individuals and organizations will contribute to the public well-being. Such a disincentive
for private organizations and individuals to contribute to the public
welfare would act to the detriment of society.
RichardP. DiegnanJr.

257

Id.

